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FREE WILL, THE DOCTRINE OF DURESS,
AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
LAWRENCE NEWMAN and LAWRENCE WEITZER
I.

INTRODUCTION

of justice should change as our concepts of man do.
This article is an attempt to examine the basic assumption of the
duress doctrine-that men possess free will-and then to evaluate
the duress doctrine in the light of the conclusions which science and
philosophy presently maintain concerning free will.
Legal responsibility, be it civil or criminal, implies freedom. To
make a contract in law requires the free acts of the participants, and
the doing of a socially reprehensible act is legally excusable, where
the actor was not a free agent. We find, therefore, that where that
most precious of all commodities, free will, is stolen, the law has
hastened to erect its doctrine of duress to mark the larceny.
Criminal duress has, at its heart, the principle of freedom. The
criminal law has, wisely or not, postulated for itself a world of freewilled agents and has fixed responsibility for action upon most classes
of actors, except those who have "acted under compulsion."
The merits of such an attitude are clear. If a person commits
an act under compulsion, responsibility for the act cannot be ascribed
to him since, in effect, it was not his own desire, or motivation, or will,
which led to the act. Punishment of the actor would be misdirected
and futile since it would deter neither him nor others, if all were
equally compelled to do acts outside of their own control. Thus, the
law has reasoned that where it can be shown that a man acted under
a compulsion which deprived him of his free will, he should not be
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held responsible for his act. This, in essence, is the thinking that lies
behind the formulation of the duress doctrine.

II. THE DuREss PRINCIPLE EXAMINED
THus,

the doctrine of duress assumes that there is such a thing

as the "will" which operates "freely," but which, under certain circumstances may be deprived of its natural activity. Yet how valid
is this assumption? Does man have the power of self-determination?
If so, when and how does he lose that power? If not, why not?
The problem of free will has plagued thinking men since the
dawn of sophisticated thought in Greece. There are three possible
positions-(1) that man does not have free will; (2) that man has
free will; (3) that man sometimes has free will and at other times

does not.
Let us first examine what is known as the determinist positionthat man does not have free will.
A.

Determinism
THE stoic word "eimarmene" meant that all things arose and
acted according to an indefeasible order.' The atomism of Democritus and Lucretius,2 coupled with the mathematical necessity in the
1 Greek and Roman life contains much fatalism, a variety of the deterministic
species in that it may set forth a definite theory of causation though it is more likely
to leave the question of causes an inscrutable mystery. While the Stoics identified
"Fate" with the course of Nature and Providence, other Greeks as well as the Romans
identified the determining power directly with the will of the gods or in some cases
thought of "Fate" as superior to the gods and to mortal men. Fatalism is prominent
in the Greek plays, especially the tragedies ("Therefore while our eyes wait to see
the destined final day, we must call no one happy who is of mortal race, until he hath
crossed life's border free from pain," SoPHocLEs, OEDipus REX; "Pray no more, for
mortals have no escape from destined woe," SoPHocLEs, ANOGONE) and is fundamental to the Greek (as well as much modern) theory of history. Herodotus, for instance, writes, "Evil had, however, to befall Scyles, and it accordingly availed itself of
the following opportunity" (Book IV, Ch. 79). Again in Book VII, Ch. 11: "It is
impossible for either party to extricate himself. The lists are set for victor and victim, in order that all our dominions may fall to The Hellenes or all Theirs to the
Persians." Polybius (Book XI, Ch. 19a) asks: "What does it profit the reader to
wade through wars and battles and sieges . . . if he is not to penetrate the knowledge
of the causes which made one party succeed and the other fail?"
2 Democritus saw that the physical properties of matter-its compressibility and
divisibility-could be explained if we assumed that matter consists of minute particles. The theory of the atom was applied to scientific research after it had been
given a more substantial foundation by quantitative experiments such as Dalton's
measurements of the ratio of weights. The atomic explanation, with its materialist
attitude, has helped us gain knowledge of such diverse phenomena as light, thermie
behavior of gases, complicated structures of organic bodies, chemical problems and
electricity.
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theories of Protagoras, Plato, Euclid and others, initiated the journey
which was to end in the modern materialistic concepts of determinism
and fatalism.' Freeing scientific thought from the anthropomorphism
of earlier periods, Copernicus paved the way for the quantitative experimental methods of Bacon and Galileo-giving rise to the synthesis of method that combines experiment with mathematical formulation, a synthesis which characterizes most physical sciences to this
day.4 The method discovered by the Greeks in their astronomy culminated in the work of Kepler and at last in that of Newton.5
The application of mathematical method has found its most conspicuous expression in the conception of causality which, though present earlier, was developed as the result of Newton's physics. Since
it was possible to express physical laws in the form of mathematical
equations, it seemed logical to believe that physical necessity could
be transformed into mathematical necessity. "The book of nature is
written in mathematical language," wrote Galileo. The laws of nature
were thought to have the structure, necessity and universality of
mathematical laws.' If mathematical laws were instruments by which
men read nature's order, these laws could also deductively predict its
future. If the future could be predicted, it was because of the necessary and inevitable operation of natural forces discoverable by laws
translated into the language of mathematics. The conclusion seemed
obvious: There had to exist a strict order among all physical happen3 The Greek contributions to science are almost exclusively (with the major exception of Aristotle) in the mathematical sciences. Geometry in particular was highly
developed and significant progress was made on the theory of numbers. For example,
the Greeks recognized the importance of prime numbers and of irrational numbers.
4 "Man, being the servant and interpreter of Nature can do . . . so much as he
has observed in fact . . ." (I) ". . . we must lead men to the particulars themselves
and their series and order; while men on their side must force themselves for awhile
to lay their notions by and begin to familiarize themselves with facts." BACON, FAcls,
APHoIusms, XXXVI. Modern philosophers of science such as Henry Margenau and
F. S. C. Northrop have characterized this duality of the deductive and the inductive
(which Bacon emphasized) as forming two epistemological categories. Northrop, for
example, refers to these categories as "Concepts by Postulation" and "Concepts by
Intuition." Cf. NoRTHRoP, F. S. C., THE LoGic OF THE SCIENcs AND HUMANITIEs
(New York, 1949) and MARGENAU, HENRY, THE NATURE OF PHYSICAL REALITY.
5 Newton's system postulated and developed the law of attraction between masses
(law of gravitation). All the observational results of Kepler's laws of planetary motion and Galileo's law of falling bodies, as well as other observable "facts" (tides,
etc.) are capable of derivation from a given set of postulates.
6 This view was the result of a physics which had predicted the existence of a
new planet with such precision that an astronomer had only to look through his
telescope to see it. The mathematical law thus appeared as the instrument not only
of order, but also of prediction.
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ings-an order identified by the word "causality." Thus there arose
the idea of a strict causality determinative of all natural occurrences.
If there were such an order behind the irregularity of experience, there must be a predetermined future which like the past would
be present if man could but know it. Thus one found La Place
holding to the belief that were an all-seeing Providence given a knowledge of the positions and momenta of all the particles in the universe
at a given instant of time, it would be able, with the help of the
Newtonian equations, to predict any future state of the universe to
the most minute detail.
In this world of nature stood man. As a part of nature he too
was subject to its laws of order. If this were so, then man had no
free will, for, as Aristotle had noted centuries earlier, ". . . that is
compulsory (and involuntary) of which the moving principle is outside. ' 7 No matter how evident or how subtle the forces, man was
subject to their laws. These forces compelled him to act in one way
or another even when he was unaware of them and believed himself
to be acting "freely." Spinoza's analysis was not foreign to those
who understood the laws of nature:
. . .The madman, the chatterer, the boy .. . all believe that they
speak by a free command of the mind, whilst, in truth, they have
no power to restrain the impulse which they have to speak, so that
experience itself, no less than reason, clearly teaches that men believe
themselves free simply because they are conscious of their own actions, knowing nothing of the causes by which they are determined
....All this plainly shows that the decree of the mind, appetite and
determination of the body are coincident in nature ....8
The regularity of cause and effect and the orderliness of nature
has to this very day influenced thought about the universe and man.
In 1926 the renowned astronomer, F. R. Moulton, stated that:
To the astronomer the most remarkable and interesting thing about
that part of the physical universe with which he has become acquainted is not its vast extent in space, nor the number and great
masses of its stars, nor the violent forces that operate in the stars,
nor the long periods of astronomical time; but that which holds him
awestruck is the perfect orderliness of the universe. . . . From the
tiny satellites in the solar system to the globular clusters, the galaxy,
and exterior galaxies, there is no chaos, there is nothing haphazard,
Ermcs, Book III, ll0a.
8 Spinoza, Baruch, "Ethics," in SPINOZA, SELECTIONS, pp. 212-213.

7 ARISTOTLE,
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and there is nothing capricious. The orderliness of the universe is the
supreme discovery in science; it is that which gives us hope that
we shall be able to understand not only the exterior world, but also
our own bodies and our own minds.'
It is this view of man and the universe, enforced by the successes
in the physical sciences, which stands as the primary argument for
determinism. "Given his heredity and environment, this thief could
not have chosen otherwise" cry the determinist penologists.10
Anything that the actor does, then, is the only thing that he
could have done at the instant of his doing it; all motives and all
power, all knowledge and all capacity, all acts and all words are
caused by the direct and indirect effects of antecedent events. Freedom, if it is conceived of as the result of any kind of conscious selfdetermination, independent of outside and/or inside forces [(see 30
So. Calif. L. Rev. 313, 332 (April 1957)] is what one determinist
has called the "illusion of choice."
Significant consequences to the duress doctrine and to our present
theories of legal responsibility follow from the determinist argument:
since all events are the result of antecedents and since no act is
"free," it is senseless to attempt to identify that series of events
which could deprive the actor of his free will. One cannot steal that
which is not present. If man does not possess free will, the doctrine
of duress is founded on a false assumption. Further, the determinist
position concerning legal responsibility would be that, since all acts
are compelled, the conclusion which results from the law's present
general premise that men should be held responsible only for their
voluntary acts is that men should never be held responsible at law.
B. Indeterminism
GIVEN the determinist conclusions with their overtones of resignation, futility and fatalism, it was not strange that men should seek

9 "Astronomy",

F. R. Moulton in THE NATURE OF THE WORLD AND OF MAN, p. 30.
example of this attitude is found in Robert Blatchford's book,
Not Guilty, p. ii (New York, 2nd ed., 1918): "I claim that men should not be classified
as good and bad, but as fortunate and unfortunate; that they should be pitied and
not blamed; helped instead of being punished. . . . I base this claim upon the selfevident and undeniable fact that man has no part in the creation of his own nature.
I shall be told this means that no man is answerable for his own acts. That is exactly what it does mean. But it will be urged, every man has a free will to act as he
chooses; and to deny this is to imperil all law and order, all morality and discipline. I
deny both these inferences. ....
"
10 An excellent
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to justify what they had hitherto felt to be valid implications of their
consciousness-that their acts were self-determined.1 1
Although Aristotle had said that there was physical necessity in
the activity of matter, he was quick to add that what was equally
important in the world was "teleological necessity." This kind of
"necessity" was only "hypothetical." He gives an example:
If a house or other such final object is to be realized, it is necessary that such and such material shall exist; and it is necessary that
first this and then that be set in motion and so on in continuous succession, until the end and final result is reached for the sake of which
the prior thing is produced and exists.12
In effect he was making a distinction between the laws of nature
and human purposes. What is necessary, then, is necessary by hypothesis; it is not determined by antecedents. While physical necessity results in conduct that is compulsory, human conduct implies
decision, initiative and action-rather than mere reaction-even
though the human being is in contact with the world of matter. Thus
11 The idea of freedom symbolizes a vague yet deep yearning in mankind.
It may take a negative form in which man is thought to exercise his freedom by
submission. Thus we have the ultimate freedom through the "Nirvana" of the Buddhists; the all-embracing freedom of the "Tao" of Lao Tze; Christianity's emphasis
on the "Kingdom of God"; the concept of "Zen" as absolute unlimited freedom cut
from the bonds of space and time; Spinoza's freedom through clear and distinct knowledge-the contemplative submission of "intellectual love"--the result of understanding
the whole of reality; Schopenhauer's surrender of the will until freedom is gained in
Nothingness, and; the freedom attained from submission to the "Absolute Spirit" via
Hegelian Dialectic. The freedom from nature and this world, the freedom found in the
naturalism of this world's processes, the freedom found in identification with the
"State" as in Naziism, or with the "Rational" as in Hegelianism, or with the "Intuitive" as in Bergsonism-all are instances of this kind of conception of the word freedom. Whether we agree with Fromm that such attempts at freedom are grounded
in feelings of inferiority, powerlessness and individual insignificance, and that they are
mechanisms for escape from a life which such persons cannot master or control, such an
"Escape from Freedom" concept has characterized most of Eastern religious thought,
and major portions of Western religion and philosophy.
On the other hand, the conception of freedom may take a more positive form.
Thus, there are those romantically tempered thinkers, for example, who would "break
down barriers, tear down established restraints and inconvenient institutions." For
these thinkers, man creates his own freedom, rather than submitting to it. Nietzsche's
Zarathustra; Whitman's robust man "shouting his barbaric yawp over the roof-tops";
Sartre's man of "en soir" and "pour soir"; Fromm's "individual" man emerging from
his original oneness with man and nature and acting in a world of spontaneity of love
and productive work; the pragmatic man-the "tough minded" men of Pierce and
James and Dewey-manipulating the world towards free-willed, consciously and
actively selected and shifting goals; and the freedom in the active skepticism of Hume
are illustrative.
12 ARISTOTLE, METApnysIcs, lO1Sa.
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among the Greeks the distinction between man and his universe was
13
emerging.
Thomas Aquinas did not neglect Aristotle's distinction, but on
its basis divided man into "intelligent agent" and "physical agent."
What are the characteristics of the intelligent agent in which the will
resides?
Now in moral actions ... there are four principles. One . .. is the
executive power.... This is the motive power which moves the limbs
to execute the command of the will. This power is moved by the judgment of the apprehensive faculty which judges the thing to be good
or bad. . . . Lastly, the apprehensive faculty is moved by the thing
apprehended....
It is in the power of the will to will and not to will; it is likewise in
its power to direct reason ...
The indeterminist position was that while causality might apply
to the natural world, it did not apply to the interior world:
As divine providence does not exclude all evil from creation, neither
does it exclude contingency, or impose necessity on all things. Now
effects are called "necessary" or "contingent" according to their
remote cause. Since, then, among proximate causes there are many
that may fail, not all effects subject to providence will be necessary
but many will be contingent. . . The form whereby a voluntary
agent acts is not determinate; for the will acts through a form apprehended by the intellect; and the intellect has not one form or effect
under consideration, but essentially embraces a multitude of forms
and therefore the will can produce multiform effects.' 5
Kant also saw this distinction between the "Universe" of scientific manipulation and "man." This man, who had been a mathematical physicist and who had supplied the intellectual rationalization for
the mathematical physics of Galileo and Newton, now turned to affirm
his belief in the operation of a free will.
Material philosophy, however, has to do with determinate objects and
the laws to which they are subject; these laws are either laws of
nature or of freedom. The science of the former is physics, that of
the latter, ethics. 6
13 By the time of Descartes, the distinction between human consciousness and
the outer world of matter (thought perhaps overemphasized into a rupture) had fully
crystallized. Cf. DEscATms, MmArrAoNs.
14 AQuiNAs, THOmAS, SUMMA

CONTRA GENTILES.

15 Ibid.
16 KANT, huEANUEL, FUNDAmNTAL

PRINCIPLES oF TnE METAPHYSICS OF MoRAis.
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The world of phenomena is ruled by causality and necessity. To
be "free" the will must operate outside of this realm." It operates
a priori, and its operation is not dependent upon experienced understanding of nature. While physical objects are treated as means,
free individuals are ends, possessing an absolute worth and dignity.
Kant concludes:
It is nothing less than the privilege it secures a rational being
of participating in the giving of Universal Laws by which it qualifies
him to be a member of a possible Kingdom of ends, a privilege to
which he was already destined by his own nature as being an end
in himself ... free as regards all Laws of physical nature, and obeying those only which he himself gives .... 17
There was mounting recognition of an autonomous will capable
of free action apart from the determined laws of nature. While
others believed that the "will" ought to be at the service of reason,
it was left for Schopenhauer to assert that the intellect arises as the
instrument of the will. Even so, the distinction between the man of
two spheres, the scientific-material and the internal was not neglected:
The body is given in two entirely different ways to the subject of
knowledge.... It is given as an idea in intelligent perceptions, as an
object among objects and subject to the law of objects. And it is
also given in quite a different way .as that which is immediately
known to everyone and is signified by the word "will"."8
Thus ran the first major argument against determinism. There
was a law of causality which objects obeyed, but man, that peculiar
mixture of reason and passion, possessed the consciousness of his self17 Ibid.
18 SCHOPENHAUER, ARTHUR, THE WORLD AS WILL AND IDEA. For Schopenhauer
the will is not subject to reason. It is "groundless" and "free." In fact it is only
because of the "will to live" that the organism "creates" his world of science with
its "laws." How, then, can "laws" of his reason control his "will"? It is just the
converse: "The whole series of actions, and consequently every individual act, and
also its condition, the whole body itself which accomplishes it, and therefore also the
process through which and in which it exists are nothing but manifestations of the
will."
While Schopenhauer sought to reach the purity of the free will by submission,
another philosopher, Nietzsche, in whom are found the roots of modern Existentialist
Philosophy, glorified the will in action. Nowhere in all of Western philosophy is the
positive power of a free will, possessing the ability to choose in the face of good or
bad, convenient or inconvenient, reasonable or unreasonable, recalled to human recognition more clearly than in the writings of Nietzsche: "The free man, the owner of a
long unbreakable will, finds in his possession his standards of value. . . . The proud
knowledge of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility, the consciousness of this
rare freedom, of this power over himself and over fate has sunk right down to his
innermost depths and has become an instinct . . . [called] his conscience." NIETzscHE,
FRIEDRICH, W., THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS.
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existence and free being. Sartre has summed up this argument in
these words:*
There is no determinism, man is free, man is freedom [and] . .. we

want freedom for freedom's sake and in every particular circumstance ....
Man is at the start a plan which is aware of itself rather
than a patch of moss, a piece of garbage, or a cauliflower. . . . Man
makes himself. He isn't ready made at the start ... he is only what
he wills himself to be ... [and he] is condemned to be free . . 19

But the indeterminists had not exhausted their arguments. They
attacked the argument that causation could exist for conscious (mental) states. C. D. Broad has stated that:
Every different human mind has its own characteristic psychical constants and different minds cannot be regarded as composed materials
of a few fundamental kinds . . . [even] if the higher kinds of

mental event be completely determined, the nature of the causation must be so unique that no analogies from inorganic matter, or
organic matter, or the lower levels of mind can have relevance to
it...
minds, mental events and physical causation are, on any view
that is worth a moment's consideration, so extremely unlike matter,
material events and physical causation that an argument by analogy
...is not very convincing.2 °
The indeterminists even attacked the validity of causal law and
determinism in science itself:
When I have asked thinking men
that every fact in the universe is
first answer has usually been that
tion" or "postulate" of scientific

what reason they had to believe
precisely determined by law, the
the proposition is a "presupposireasoning. Well, if that is the

best that can be said for it, the belief is doomed ....

a proposition is no more than to hope it is true.2 '

To "postulate"

19 SARTRE, JEAN PAUL, ExissENnms
(New York, 1947). The works of Kierkegaard-with the awareness of his "passion freedom"; James' philosophy-a lesson in
the power of conscious awareness to achieve its purposes in action: "To bid man's
subjective interest be passive till truth expresses itself from the environment, is to bid
the sculptor's chisel be passive till the statute express itself from out the stone"; the
search into the nature of consdousness-"the eidetic image" of the Phenomenology of
Heidegger and Husserl-all these philosophies represent the "existential" approach.
They start with man and the certainties of his own consciousness of free choice and
being.
20 BROAD, C. D., INDnTErmINISi, Fo.Imss AND) VALUE, p.'147 (Cambridge, 1934).
See also BROAD, MiN- AND MAtER and Eddington's comments in DAvInsoN, FREE WILL
OR DETERtIaNISM, p. 26.
21 This statement was made by Charles S. Pierce, one of the founders of pragmatism. The fact that the determinist premise was thought to destroy the basis of ethical
and esthetic judgments explains why the pragmatists were quick to fight for free will.
Shifting the line of attack, James held that the question of free will could not be
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Even some of the determinists sought to make room in the strict
causal nexus for the novelty of a free-willed act. The renowned
physicist and philosopher Herbert Samuel concludes such an attempt
in these words:
In the combination of events, which is the cause of any particular
event within the sphere of human activity, there will always be a
number of actions by persons, following upon individual decisions
of their own. . . . These decisions were autonomous; [the person]
might have chosen to do otherwise .... The immediate point is that
free decisions of individual persons form part and usually a decisive
part, in the causation of human events .. . [thus recognizing] free
will but as inside and not outside the vast complex of causality.22
But it was not necesary to manipulate free will within the realm
of scientific discourse. Science itself had been moving towards a
rejection of its previous notions of atomism, prediction, cause and
effect, necessity and the status of mathematics and geometry. The
older conceptions of a mechanical world of "dead" matter, the "Newtonian world machine" and the "indivisible atom" (the "building
blocks" of the Universe) were breaking down or undergoing change,
solved on strictly psychological grounds or even from a purely theoretical point of
view. Cf. JAmEs, WILLIAm, THE PucINPLES oF PSYCHOLOGY, vol. II, pp. 572 (New
York, 1950). The problem, then, becomes that of forming a moral postulate about the
Universe. Our sense of freedom and the existence of effort on the part of human beings
point to the fact that some things are decided by human choice. Thus James writes: "Our
first act of freedom, if we are free, ought, in all inward propriety, be to affirm that
we are free." Cf. JAmEs, WLAM, THE WILL TO BE=IvE AD OTHER ESSAYS IN PopuLAR PHILOSOPHY, p. 146 (New York, 1917).
James has set out an interesting argument along these lines when he poses the dilemma of the determinists regarding judgments of regret and tragedies: "When murders and treacheries cease to be sins, regrets
are theoretical absurdities and errors. . . . Murder and treachery cannot be good without regret being bad; regret cannot be good without treachery and murder being bad.
Both however are supposed to have been foredoomed; so something must be fatally
unreasonable, absurd, and wrong in the world." Cf. ibid., pp. 163-164. Not only are
these emotions proof of the making of judgments on actions considered freely done,
but they demonstrate the necessity for their existence (and therefore of free will) if
we take man as he is, if we desire a life of interest and zest, and admit of real, genuine possibilities in the world. In this connection one cannot help but recall the famous
saying of Kant. "I ought, therefore I can.' The sense of personal responsibility which
expresses itself most clearly in our feelings of obligation, or the sense of "ought" is
equally meaningless apart from the power of choice. Thus an eminent biologist has recently written that:
"The ability of man to choose freely between ideas and act is one of the fundamental characteristics of human evolution. Perhaps freedom is even the most important of
the specifically human attributes. . . . Ethics emanate from freedom and are unthinkable without freedom." DOBZANSicy, THEoDoSrUS, T= BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUrAN
FREEDoM, p. 134 (New York, 1956). The same holds true for other judgments such as
loyalty, praise, blame, rewards, punishments, approval and disapproval. Cf. WERXmmsER, W zLIrm H., A PHILosopHY oF ScmcNC, p. 436 (New York, 1940).
22 SA MFL, HERBERT, ESSAY In PHYSICS, p. 24 (Oxford, 1951).
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indicating that nature is not to be compared to the exact functioning
of a machine, and that the concepts of possibility and of becoming
23
are not vain human illusions.
With recent developments in atomic physics, we find A. H. Compton writing that: "natural phenomena do not obey exact laws" and
that we must "abandon our cherished law of causality"; Schr6dinger
stating that: "as soon as the great majority of all these [physical]
laws are seen to be of a statistical nature, they cease to provide a
rational argument for the retention of determinism"; Langmuir asserting that: "[There are many phenomena] .

..

subject to the laws

of chance and therefore unpredictable"; and Reichenbach concluding: "Gone is the ideal of a universe whose course follows strict
rules, a predetermined cosmos ...

the happenings of nature are like

rolling dice; they are controlled by probability laws, not by caus24
ality.
On the other hand, the best hopes of the indeterminists have not
been realized. As late as 1951 Einstein wrote:
To be sure, when the number of factors coming into play in phenomenological complex is too large, scientific method in most cases fails.
...Nevertheless no one doubts that we are confronted with a causal
connection whose causal components are in the main known to us.
. . . We have penetrated far less deeply into the regularities obtain-

ing within the realm of living things, but deeply enough nevertheless
to sense at least the rule of fixed necessity ....

The more a man is

imbued with the ordered regularity of all events, the firmer becomes
23 "Ever since 1861 when Maxwell published his second famous paper on electromagnetics, entitled, "On Physical Lines of Force," there have been two major branches
of modem physics, the one associated with Newton, La Place, Dalton and Ampere
and called particle physics, and the other identified with Faraday, Maxwell, Larmor,
Lorentz and Einstein and termed field physics. It has been one of the most grievous
errors of philosophical thought and of scientific thought outside of theoretical physics
to identify the whole of modern physics with nothing but particle theory." NoRTnRoP, F. S. C., THE LoGic OF T=E ScIENcEs AND T=x HuamA
, p. 223 (New York,

1949).

24 COmPTON, ARTHUR, THE FREEDOM oF MAN, p. 7 (New Haven, 1935); FRANK,

JEROME, FATE AND FREEDOM, ch. XII (Boston, 1953); RmCHENBACH, HANS, THE RISE

OF SCIENTIIC PHMOSOPHE, p. 248 (Berkeley, 1951).
Yet as this article was being prepared for the printer, the N. Y. Times, on March 1,
1958, p. 1, col. 2, carried the following article: "PnHSlCIST ENVISIONS A KEY TO ALL
NATURE. Bonn, Germany, Feb. 28--Professor Werner Heisenberg, a renowned nuclear
physicist, believes he may have discovered a new constant in nature-the 'shortest
length'. . . . His theory, if proved correct, would subject all of nature to a single rule.
His mathematical calculations tend to show the 'beautiful simplicity' of the universe
when reduced to its essential components, Professor Heisenberg said."
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his conviction that there is no room left by the side of this ordered
regularity for causes of a different nature. 5
The words of Somerset Maugham written in 1938 are still not
out of date:
The metaphor of chess, though frayed and shop-worn, is here wonderfully apposite. The pieces were provided and I had to accept the
mode of action that was characteristic of each one; I had to accept
the moves of the persons I played with; but it has seemed to me
that I had the power to make on my side, in accordance perhaps with my likes and dislikes and the ideal that I set before me,
moves that I freely willed. It has seemed to me that I have now
and then been able to put forth an effort that was not wholly determined. If it was an illusion it was an illusion that had its own efficacy.
The moves I made, I know now, were often mistaken, but in one
way and another they have tended to the end in view. I wish that
I had not committed a great many errors, but I do not deplore them
nor would I now have them undone.
I do not think it unreasonable to hold the opinion that everything
in the universe combines to cause every one of our actions and this
naturally includes all our opinions and desires; but whether an action
once performed, was inevitable from all eternity can only be decided
when you have made up your mind whether or no there are events,
the events that Dr. Broad calls casual progenitors, which are not completely determined. Hume long ago showed that there was no intrinsic connection between cause and effect which could be perceived by
the mind; and of late the Principle of Indeterminacy, by bringing to
view certain events to which apparently no causes can be assigned,
has cast a doubt on the universal efficacy of those laws upon which
science has hitherto been based. It looks as if chance must once
more be reckoned with. But if we are not certainly bound by the law
of cause and effect, then perhaps it is not an illusion that our wills
are free. .

.

.Perhaps the Te Deum has been sung too soon. It is

well to remember that the two most eminent scientists of our day
regard Heisenberg's principle with scepticism. Planck has stated his
25 EiNsTEN, ALBERT, OUT or My LATER YEARS, p. 28 (New York, 1950). Planck
argues similarly: ". . . the principle of causality must prevail .... [We] must differentiate between the validity of the causal principle and the practicability of its operation." PLANCK, WHETP Is SCiENCF GoING? ch. IV (New York, 1932). In an article
in the Spring, 1954 issue of Diogenes, Henry Margenau, one of the country's foremost
philosophers of science concluded after an analysis of causality in quantum electrodynamics: "Quantum mechanics, Fegnam's quantum electrodynamics and the uncertainty principle, do not do away with the view of a causally determined world of
events." See F. S. C. Northrop's conclusions as early as 1928 to the same effect:
"Nevertheless causality holds in field physics as in particle physics and in quantum
mechanics, for the result of Maxwell's new definition of state is not to invalidate causality, but to designate more precisely the action of the past on the future in a peculiar
way." The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities, p. 223.
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belief that further research will sweep away the anomaly, and Einstein has described the philosophical ideas that have been based upon
it as 'literature'; I am afraid that this is only his civil way of calling
them nonsense. The physicists themselves tell us that physics is
making such rapid progress that it is only possible to keep abreast
of it by a close study of the periodical literature. It is surely rash
to found a theory on principles suggested by a science that is so unThe plain man is justified in sitting on the fence, but perstable ....
haps he is prudent to keep his legs dangling on the side of determinism. 6
The immediate future seems to hold out little prospect of the
1
abatement of this aspect of the controversy
Occasional Free Will
THIS theory of free will depends, for whatever substantiality it
possesses, on the premise that while many events do not deprive the
will of its free operation, it is possible to classify certain events
which do have the effect of temporarily depriving the will of its free
agency. As a theory, then, it comes closest to a belief in the existence of a free will, since what it seeks to discover are events which
destroy the free will's existence. Although supposedly skirting the
problems of "determinism" and "indeterminism," this theory creates
seriously contradictory and impractical concepts. The indeterminists
would argue that the premise that the will is free can mean only that
it can exert itself in spite of the character of events foreign to it.
That is, the will is also free as to the supposedly coercive class of
events. The argument of the determinists in opposition to this third
theory would simply be that the will always remains controlled.
C.

III.
A.

CONCLUSION

The Dilemma

WE suggest that it is difficult, on philosophical or scientific
grounds, to justify the position that man sometimes has free will and
at other times does not. Our thesis, then, is that both the determinist and indeterminist position concerning free will offer serious logical obstacles to a rational statement of the duress doctrine and that
THE SunmG Up, pp. 281-283 (London, 1938).
27"A look at the protagonists is disheartening. Determinist: The Stoics, Democritus, La Place, Leibnitz, Spinoza, Fichte, Comte, Buckle, Einstein, Planck, Margenau,
Davidson, Northrop. Indeterminist: Epicures, Pierce, Broad, Eddington, Schrodinger,
Langmuir, Compton, G. N. Lewis.
26 MAUG AM, W. SOMFERSET,
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the determinist position questions our present theories of criminal
responsibility as well.
Let us assume that the parties involved in a criminal duress
situation do not have free will-that their acts are governed by
absolute necessity. It follows that the duressed, since he had no possibility of free action, could never claim that he was coerced.
Moreover, basic theories of responsibility are brought into question. How is a man to be held responsible for acting as he was (and
always is) ordained to choose? The theory that punishment is based
on deterrence becomes untenable because unless man possesses the
capacity for free action, the punishment of one person can have no
deterrent effect upon another. The theory that punishment will reform the convicted person is illogical because the person who is punished is as completely compelled to perform his future actions as he
was to commit his past crime. The concept that there is a moral
justification for punishment is no more persuasive than the other
theories, because without free choice any moral elements in the situation disappear. Although the determinist position casts serious doubt
upon the theories that punishment has a deterrent, reformative or
moral value, it does not follow that there can never be any punishment for a crime. What it does mean, however, is that society may
have to replace the concepts of moral justification, deterrence and
reformation with a more rational basis for punishment. Perhaps this
more rational basis would be a theory of society protection or one
of social vengeance.
On the other hand, let us assume that the duressed does have
free will. This means that human choices are completely undetermined, that there is no compelling reason why a person should choose
to perform the action which he does in preference to any other. The
duressed can choose freely between alternatives regardless of the
causal nexus of events ("outside influences"). If this is so, then no
series of events can ever be said to coerce the will of the duressed.
No matter how onerous or pleasant the alternatives, no matter how
distressing or delightful the consequences, the duressed has the heavy
responsibility of free choice. In terms of the duress rationale, which
only permits excuse for acts done under coercion, he can never be
excused from responsibility since he has always retained the capacity
to choose freely. This is what Sartre means when he writes, "existentialism's first move is to make every man aware of what he is [a
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free-willing agent] and to make the full responsibility of his existence
rest on him."
This, then, is the dilemma the courts must face: If they recognize free will, they can never (at least in terms of a free-will doctrine) posit its deprivation. This indeterminist position renders the
duress doctrine useless because the doctrine is based on the assumption that a person can be deprived of his free will. If this free will
can never be lost, the duress doctrine can never operate.
Yet, if the courts accept the determinist view, the duress doctrine fares no better. According to the determinist, a person's action
is always compelled. The effect of this theory is to leave us with a
duress doctrine which operates only when something is lost which
has never existed.
B. A Suggested Solution
A REAFFIRMATION of our faith in freedom is no solution. A solution to the problem of duress lies neither in the determinist's absolute denial of free will nor in the indeterminist's affirmation of free
will. Though we may feel that the arguments (if not our own needs)
for a belief in free will are more persuasive than those of determinism, such a belief does not help us in determining either the scope
of criminal responsibility or the extent of excuse from such responsibility.
The law must give up its present formulation of the duress doctrine. It must put aside the issues of free will altogether, profiting
from its experiences with the concept and from the failure of this
concept to serve desired purposes.
The solution may perhaps be found by returning to basic principles. The law is an attempt to establish certain ends and to formulate doctrines which best attain them with a minimum of conflict and
contradiction and a maximum of reason in statement.
What are the ends of the laws? The law seeks to make judgments about certain acts. The doing of these acts are "evil" (for
one reason or another) and they are labelled crimes.28 Taking the
selection of acts that are presently considered by the law as "evil"
28 The reasons for labelling some acts crimes and others not, are to be found
among the hierarchy of values which the community embraces. Values can be clarified

and goals set, and acts which run contrary to the effective disbursement and continuance of those values and the achievement of those goals can be located in space and
time and can be condemned.
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and thus made criminal, our next step is to ask the question: "Are
all men to be held answerable for the commission of these crimes?"
The law has already answered no to this question. For a variety of
reasons, the soundness of which we need not examine here, it has
chosen to excuse certain persons from responsibility even where it is
conclusively shown that they committed the crime.29
Thus, the issue which has become of vital importance is the
basic meaning of the rule of excuse. A statement of the rule of excuse formulated in terms of the free-will concept is useless. However, it must be recognized that the duress doctrine which implies
that certain events do away with free will is basically an attempt to
achieve an end which the law considers desirable. This end is expressed in the general principle that persons should be held responsible for their criminal acts except where the situation is such that
society at large, through the courts as its instruments, can conclude
that the law should not in a particular case exact its pound of flesh.
In applying the duress doctrine, the courts were, in effect, seeking
to "mitigate" the "responsibility" for the act until under ideal conditions (deprivation of free will) the responsibility could be said to
be non-existent. Yet this is precisely what is meant when we use the
word "excuse." To "excuse" is to admit the commission of an act
but to impose conditions which, if met, will permit the actor to escape
the consequences of that act. In law, then, to "excuse" is not to deny
responsibility for the crime, but to exclude the actor from the scope
.of the legal consequences resulting from the crime. The law need
not make a judgment one way or another as to the "responsibility"
of the actor (thus escaping the free-will dilemma). It need only for29 The law does not hold insane persons or those under a certain age responsible for their acts. A Minnesota statute declares that the presumption of responsibility
includes all individuals except, (1) children under seven years of age (2) idiots, imbediles, lunatics and insane persons who are incapable. MIm. STAT. § 610.08 (1953).
A California statute adds "All persons are capable of committing crimes except those
belonging to the following classes: "(1) Children under 14, in the absence of clear
proof that at the time of the act charged they knew its wrongfulness, (2) Idiots,
(3) Lunatics and Insane Persons, (4) Persons who committed the act or made the
omission charged under an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves criminal
intent, (5) Persons acting without being conscious thereof, (6) Persons acting through
misfortune or accident where there is no evil design, intention or culpable negligence,
(7) Married women (except for felonies) acting under threats, commands or coercion
of their husbands. CAL. PENAr. CODE § 26 (1956). Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 836-05 (1944);
IDAHO CODE §§ 18-201 (1947); ILL. REv. STAT. §§ 500-595 (1949); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 94-201 (1947); N. J. REV. STAT. tit. 2, § 2:103-3 (1937); N. Y. PENAL
CODE § 859 (1944); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 152 (7), § 155 (1937); R. I. GEN.
LAWS AiN. c. 606, 2 17 (1938).
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mulate the conditions under which it can be said that legal consequences will follow from the act and the circumstances in which they
will not.
Though the free-will concept is useless in establishing a consistent and meaningful legal doctrine, many of the circumstances which
were important in the application of the duress doctrine can continue to be utilized in establishing the more consistent legal doctrine
of "mitigation."
Let us take an example. Y kills Z. Y claims X "coerced" him.
Under the approach we suggest, Y would claim "mitigating circumstances." These circumstances would include (1) X's statements of
predictive intent, given Y's peculiar psychology and environment,
(2) the time of the statements and their relation in time to the act,
(3) the opportunities for escape or avoidance, and (4) the gravity of
the crime committed.
Applying the rule of mitigation, the law could use presently existing standards to set the bounds of proof or to indicate to the jury
the requirements necessary to establish such mitigation. Assume
that in our case the crime is murder, and that th courts are willing
to permit an excuse to murder. The jury would consider all the evidence introduced to establish mitigation.
The rule would be as follows. "Where a person is tried for any
crime, he may plead 'guilty' with mitigating circumstances." Such
mitigating circumstances may be threats by another, or any other
factors which the accused feels the court should consider in arriving
at an assessment of the consequences that should follow from the act.
A verdict of guilty then would state only that the individual and not
another was the final cause of the criminal act. In concluding which
circumstances are sound inferences leading to a finding of mitigating
circumstances the Court or jury would consider: (1) the nature
and gravity of the act done, (2) the nature of the force exerted
upon the defendant (threats, economic necessity, hardship), (3) the
relationship between the time when the act was done and
the force threatened, and (4) the personal psychological peculiarities of the individual availing himself of the defense (insane, young,
infirm, psychotic, etc.). Unlike duress, a finding of mitigating circumstances per se would not necessarily exclude the flow of all consequences. Thus there could be a division into findings of (1) "no
mitigation," (2) mitigation sufficient to cut off the flow of conse-

NEW YORK LAW FORUM

[VOL. 4

quences completely, (3) mitigation sufficient to cut off only part of
the flow of consequences. Just how much of the consequences were
to remain would be a jury or court question, just as it is now left
for the jury or judge to determine the length of consequences where
duress is not shown.
The merits of such a proposal would be that:
(1) The inconsistencies of the free-will concept would be removed from the legal doctrine which operates in this area.
(2) The law would not be hampered in enlarging or restricting
the flow of consequences for criminal acts to fit the particular individual circumstances of the case being judged. This would result
from allowing the jury to make decisions concerning degrees of coercion. Under present doctrines, the decision has to be "coerced" or
"not coerced." There is thus no room for the cases in which the
jury, though not sure whether the duressed has been completely
coerced, is certain that there was some degree of duress operative.
Under the suggested proposal, instead of being forced to a decision
which either completely exonerates the defendant or which holds him
fully responsible, the jury would be able to arrive at a balance of
consequences which better suits the individual judgment and experience of the jurors, and which meets each particular case more directly.

